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Bilaterally  or  Not  at  All!
Clayton K.  Yeutter
For  most  of  the  20th  century,  much  of the
world  has  fretted  about  agricultural  surpluses.
This  has  been  particularly  true  of the  major  pro-
ducing nations,  with the United States being in the
forefront.  Only  a  decade  ago,  our  "ever  normal
granaries"  were  bursting  at  their steel  seams,  and
we  were  immersed  in  another agonizing  appraisal
of U.S. farm policy.
Then  the shock  came!  In 1972 everything went
wrong  on  the  production  front-droughts,  early
frosts,  monsoon  problems,  even  the  fish  meal
supply  diminished  because  of  an  uncooperative
ocean  current.  We  suddenly  realized  that  man
was  not  quite  as  omniscient  as  he  thought,
especially  in the  field  of weather control. And the
Soviets  realized  that  they  had  a  demanding  con-
sumer  sector,  even  under a  totalitarian regime. All
of  this  caused  reverberations  throughout  this
planet  of  ours,  and  the  "world  food  problem"
was  born.  Attention  turned  from  surplus  disposal
programs  to  concern  over  production  and  access
to that production.
The  basic  question,  of  course,  is  "Can  the
world  continue  to  feed  itself?"  It  is not my pur-
pose  to answer  that query here, for it is a question
the  scope  of  which  goes  far  beyond the  arena  of
international  trade policy.
One  factor, however,  is so simple as to be  often
overlooked.  At any  given  point  in  time,  we  ought
to do  the  best we can with what we have!  In other
words,  with  a  finite  quantity  of  agricultural  pro-
ducts  available,  or  about  to become  available  in
the  short  run,  those  products  should  move  in
international  trade  to  where  they  are  most  in
demand.  The  principle  of  comparative  advantage
should  establish  short-run  production  patterns,
and  the  rules  of international  trade  should  facil-
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itate  the  distribution  of  that  production  in  re-
sponse to competitive  market forces.
An  oversimplified  model,  such  as  the  one  I
have  just  outlined,  obviously  does  not  describe
the  real  world.  It  is easy  to rationalize  departures
from  the  model,  particularly  if  one  is  philo-
sophically  uncommitted  to  a  market  oriented
economic  system  in  the  first  place.  The  tempta-
tion  of  government intervention  has been  irresist-
ible  in  many  nations,  including  some  which  are
in  dire  need  of  expanded  food  production.  As
a  consequence,  these  nations  have  often  ended
up  with  agricultural  production  disincentives,
rather  than  incentives,  in  their  system.  This  has
been  a  tragedy  for  their  people,  for  the  rules  of
distribution  and  trade  are  meaningless  if  there  is
little to distribute  or to export.
As economists,  we should do all we can to point
out  the  probable  economic  repercussions  of de-
parting  from  well  established  economic principles.
This  applies,  of  course,  to  domestic  production
and  marketing  policies,  an  area  in which  econo-
mists  have  usually  had  a  good  bit  to  say,  and at
times  considerable  influence.  But  it  also  applies
to  international  trade  policy,  an  area  in  which
economists  have  traditionally  been  much  less
active,  and  of relatively  limited  influence.  There-
fore,  I would  like  to concentrate  today  on  1) in-
ternational  trade  policy  in  the  agricultural  sector
as  it  now  exists,  2)  efforts  that  are  underway  to
alter the international  trading system, and  3)  some
contributions  that  agricultural  economists  might
appropriately make to that alteration.
The Reduction and Elimination of Trade Barriers
If the  basic  objective  of the  principle  of com-
parative  advantage  is  even to be approached in the
real  world, it  is imperative  that  barriers to agricul-
tural  trade  be  reduced  and,  where  feasible,  elimi-
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inated.  Increased  agricultural  production  is  of
limited  usefulness  in  feeding  the  hungry  of  the
world  if  it  cannot  move  freely  across  national
borders.  Yet,  though  this  is well  understood,  bar-
riers  to  agricultural  trade  continue  to proliferate.
In  many  cases,  nations have  become  more,  rather
than  less,  protectionist  in  recent  years.  They have
become  highly  imaginative  in their approach,  add-
ing a gamut of non-tariff barriers to the  tariffs that
have  been with us for centuries.
Why  do  they  do  this  in  the  face  of  palpable
starvation  in  certain  parts  of  the  world,  and  in
direct  contradiction  to  the  interests  of their own
consumers?  As  usual, the  reason  is part economic,
part  political.  Some  domestic  agricultural  sectors
are  often  in  a  price  depressing  surplus  situation,
even  when aggregate food stocks are at dangerously
low  levels.  This has been  true,  for example,  in the
dairy  industry  of many  countries  in  recent  years,
even  though  grains  have  been  in  short  supply.
Beyond  that,  agricultural  interests  are  politically
strong  in  many  countries,  especially  in  the
developed  world,  even  though  their  numbers  have
diminished  dramatically  with  the  technological
revolution.  In  some,  farmers  hold  the  balance  of
political  power,  thereby  wielding  an  exceptional
degree  of political influence.
As  a  result  of  all  this,  domestic  agricultural
interests  frequently  seek-and  obtain-protection
from  the  agricultural  exports  of  other  nations.
When  they  are non-competitive  internationally  (as
is  true,  for  example,  for  much  of the  small  scale
agriculture  of  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity), they battle vigorously for that protection,
because their  survival is at stake.
Trade Barriers Erected for Defensive  Purposes
The  first  element  of  agricultural  trade  restric-
tions is  thus defensive  in nature, oriented to keep-
ing  exports  out.  For  many  years,  this  was  done
through  tariffs.  But  the  effectiveness  of tariffs  as
a  protective  mechanism  has  waned during the past
three  decades.  This  is  due  to  the  half  dozen
rounds  of  trade  negotiations  that  have  been  con-
ducted  under  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs
and  Trade  (the  GATT),  with  tariff levels  having
been  progressively  lowered  during  these  negotia-
tions.  The  GATT  has  helped  move  the  principles
of  comparative  advantage  a  bit  closer  to reality
though,  unfortunately,  with  less  success  in  agri-
culture than in the industrial  sector.
As  domestic  industries,  both  agricultural  and
non-agricultural,  in  the  U.S.  and  elsewhere  have
observed  the  progressive  crumbling  of  tariff
protection,  other  protective  mechanisms  have
been  devised  by  their  governments.  One  must
give  reverse  "credit"  where  it  is  due;  they  have
done  this  very  effectively  indeed.  So-called  "non-
tariff  barriers"  have  become  the  major  impedi-
ment  to  world  trade  today.  Whereas  the  previous
rounds  of  GATT  negotiations  dealt  almost  exclu-
sively  with tariffs,  with non-tariff barriers scarcely
even  being  mentioned,  the  present Tokyo  Round
of  negotiations  probably  will  devote  far  more
time  to  the  latter than  to the  former.  It must do
so if substantial  progress is to be made.
What  are  all these  non-tariff barriers,  and  what
are  we  seeking  to do about  them in Geneva? Let's
take  the major ones on an individual basis.
The  first, of course,  is quantitative  restrictions,
quotas  if you  will.  We  in  the  U.S.  have  them  in
dairy  products,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  meat.
Both  programs  have  been  vigorously  attacked  in
Geneva.  Other  nations  have  even  more  restric-
tions  of  this  nature.  Though  Japan  is  our  best
agricultural  customer,  it  has  a  multitude  of QRs,
including  a  program  on  meat  that  was  at  least
partially  responsible  for  forcing  us into  our  own
voluntary  restraint  program.  The  European  Eco-
nomic  Community  likewise  has  numerous  quan-
titative  restrictions,  along  with  its  variable  levy
system.  And  the  lesser  developed  countries  have
moved heavily  to quota programs, typically  ration-
alizing  them  on  balance  of payments  grounds,  or
for  'safeguard"  purposes,  i.e.,  to  protect  infant
industries.
From  an  economist's  viewpoint,  a quantitative
restriction  is  one  of  the  most disconcerting  trade
barriers  of all,  for  it  flies  directly  in  the  face  of
competitive  forces. What good does it do to become
more  efficient  than  anyone  else in  wheat produc-
tion,  e.g.,  if  one  can  sell  only  "X"  bushels  in  a
given  market  irrespective  of price  considerations?
Yet  this  is  the  situation  faced  by  many  of  our
competitive  agricultural  industries  (and  the  com-
petitive industries of many other countries as  well),
all  to  protect  relatively  less  efficient  agricultural
producers  of importing  nations.  Perhaps  one  can
rationalize  a  certain  production level of basic food
products  in  any  country,  even  though  that  pro-
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duction  be  uneconomic  and  violative  of the  prin-
ciple  of  comparative  advantage.  Political  and  pos-
sibly  even  national  security  considerations  may
predominate  in such  a case.  But this too should be
kept in perspective  by policy  makers.  Does  a  goal
of "total  self-sufficiency in rice"  really make sense
in Japan?  Partial self-sufficiency,  perhaps; but total
self-sufficiency,  one  must  wonder!  At  the  very
least,  the  economists  of Japan,  the  United  States,
or  any  other  country  should  point  out  to  their
policy  makers  the  opportunity  cost  of  such
decisions.
Quantitative  restrictions  form  one  of the  major
areas  of effort  now  underway  in  the Multilateral
Trade  Negotiations  in Geneva (the Tokyo  Round).
So  far,  we  have  had notifications  and  discussions
on  a  bilateral  basis  between  and  among  the  90
nations  that  are  participating.  We  are  not  yet  at
the  negotiating  stage,  even  bilaterally,  and  far
from  it  on  devising  any  multilateral  solutions  to
this problem.  But we need to work at it with vigor,
lest  we  conclude  the  negotiations  with little  pro-
gress in this distortive area of international  trade.
The  European  Community  has  resisted  the
inclusion  of variable  levies in  the  Geneva delibera-
tions  of  the  Quantitative  Restrictions  Group.  It
has,  in fact,  resisted  their inclusion  in the  delibera-
tions  of  any  of the  basic  functional  MTN  groups,
notwithstanding  their  obvious  effect  on  inter-
national trade.
Variable  levies  are  among  the  most  frustrating
trade  barriers  of  all,  particularly  to  the  U.S.  and
other  exporters  as  they  seek  to establish  markets
in the  Community  and  in other  nations which  use
them.  The essence  of the variable  levy  is that when
world  market  prices  fall,  the  levy  automatically
increases.  This  makes  it  essentially  impossible  for
an  exporting  country  to  expand  its  sales  even
though  market  conditions  would  ordinarily  pro-
vide  that  thrust. The  positive  impact  on  sales that
should  result  where  import  demand  is  not  com-
pletely  inelastic  is negated  by the variable  levy.
This  not  only  frustrates  the  competitiveness  of
a  given  country,  such  as  the  U.S.,  but  it  also
shifts-in  a  distortive  way-the  burden  of market
adjustments.  The  international  market  for  a  given
commodity  becomes  "thinner,"  because  those
nations  which  apply the variable  levy isolate them-
selves  from  the impact  (or at least the full impact)
of  supply  and  demand  conditions  elsewhere.
Though  their  market  remains  relatively  stable,
price  fluctuations  elsewhere  become  greater  than
would otherwise  be the case. This occurred,  for ex-
ample,  as the  world  sought to adjust to  the severe
drought  in  the  U.S.  Corn  Belt in  1974. The  price
of feed  grains  rose  dramatically  in  the  U.S.  and in
most parts of the world. U.S.  livestock and poultry
producers  suffered  through  severe  financial  losses
and  ultimately  adjusted  by  altering  the  grain  con-
tent  of  their  rations,  reducing  feeding  periods,
and  in  some  cases  even closing  down  their  opera-
tions.  It was  a  major adjustment  on  our part,  and
one  reason  was  that  nations  with  variable  levies
did  not share  in that  adjustment.  Feed grain  usage
in  the  European  Community  changed  very  little
during  that  period  and,  in  fact,  its mountain  of
dairy surpluses continued  to rise.
Variable  levies  have  a cost, to the  world trading
community  as  a  whole  since  they  are  a flagrant
departure  from  the  principle  of  comparative  ad-
vantage,  and  particularly  to  those  nations  which
are  forced to absorb  the world's supply and demand
adjustments.  But  they  also  have  a cost to  the con-
sumers  of the  nations which  use  them.  Their  pro-
ponents  argue  that  they  provide  stability.  That
they  do,  but it  is  the worst possible kind of stabil-
ity for a consumer!  In terms of food costs, variable
levies  simply remove  the valleys,  and leave the con-
sumer  with  nothing  but  peaks!  That,  unfortun-
ately,  is  the  lot  of EC consumers, and will  be until
they achieve  a stronger political  presence than they
have today.
Import licenses, import deposits, customs regu-
lations,  customs  valuation procedures, and mini-
mum  import prices all  have  many of the distortive
features  of  quantitative  restrictions.  Sometimes
they  are  even  more  troublesome,  for  the  restric-
tiveness  is difficult,  if not impossible,  to prove.  In
licensing,  for example,  licenses just do not  seem to
be issued!  Or,  if they  are  issued,  it  is  after  an  in-
ordinate  delay-usually  at  about  the  time  the
product  is  no  longer  in  season  in  the  exporting
country!  Administrative  procedures  can  be  excep-
tionally  time  consuming  when  someone  has  a
vested  interest in  their being so.
Import  deposit  schemes  obviously  have  a cost.
Money  is not  interest  free,  and  the  cost of a de-
posit  must be  borne  by  someone  in  the marketing
process.
Customs  regulations  can  be  as  frustrating  as
import  licensing.  At  times,  it  takes  a long  while
for  all  those  forms to  be  completed  and  stamped.
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With  perishable  products,  they  seem  to  be  com-
pleted just as  the product has "perished."
Finally,  valuation  procedures  can  add  an  un-
expected cost to imports as well. One would asume
that  the  invoice  price  would  be  used  as the  base
for  customs  valuation  procedures,  but  this  is
often not  the  case.  One of our neighbor countries,
for  example,  uses  "official  prices"  on  many  im-
ported goods,  and  these  prices often  are  consider-
ably higher than the invoice  amount.
All  of  these  practices  are  presently  being
scrutinized  in  a  Customs  Subgroup  in  Geneva.
Hopefully  progress  will  be  made  to  minimize
their  impact  on  international  trade.  In  partic-
ular,  changes  in  this  area  are  contributions  that
the  less  developed  countries  could  and  should
make to the MTN.
Even  standards,  whose  basic  purpose  is  to
foster  trade,  can  be  and  are  used  to  impede
it.  About  two  years  ago  Canada  banned  the
import  of  U.S.  beef,  allegedly  because  we  then
permitted  our cattle  feeders  to use  diethylstilbes-
trol  as  a  feed additive.  DES significantly  increases
weight  gains  in  fattening  cattle,  but  there  is
evidence  that it may also have carcinogenic  proper-
ties  under certain  conditions. Hence,  the Canadian
standard  presumably  was  designed  to protect  the
health  of  its consumers  of beef.  USDA, however,
responded  to  the  Canadian  situation  by  imple-
menting a series of surveillance and other measures,
the  purpose  of which  was to  insure that U.S.  beef
entering  Canada  would  not contain  DES  residues.
Eventually  the  Canadian  government  recognized
the  effectiveness  of these  measures.  Within  a few
hours  of  doing  so,  they  implemented  a  highly
restrictive  quota program  on U.S.  beef!  One must
wonder  just  how  relevant  health  considerations
were in the original  ban.
A  similar  situation  occurred  recently  involving
U.S.  citrus  exports  to Japan. The Japanese  govern-
ment  abruptly  banned  imports  of  citrus  which
had  been  treated  by either of two particular fungi-
cides,  even  though  both  had  been  approved  for
use  by  Codex  Alimentarius,  an  international
standards  body  of  which  Japan  is  a  member!
This case is still under negotiation today.
Fortunately,  we  appear  to  be  making progress
on  the  standards  front  in Geneva.  A good  deal of
work  has  been  done  over  the  past  two  or  three
years,  and  hopefully  a  procedural  code  will  reach
fruition  in  1977.  This  code  will  not  establish
standards;  its  purpose  is  to  provide  a  set of rules
that  are  to  be  followed  by  nations  (or  other
entities  such  as  Codex  Alimentarius)  in  the  stan-
dards making  process. The basic intent is to obtain
an  open  and  transparent  procedure,  so  that  those
affected  will  have  an  opportunity  to  comment  on
a  proposed  standard  before  it  is  implemented
rather  than  after.  In  too  many  countries  that  is
not now the  case.  Other nations  are much less  in-
clined  to  be  as  open  in the conduct  of their regu-
latory and regulatory-related  programs as we  are.
Government procurement practices  have  many
of  the  same  restrictive  features  as  standards
making.  That  is,  the basic problem is that procure-
ment  practices  are  not  open.  A  foreign company
rarely  is  the  winning  bidder  on  government  pro-
curement  contracts.  In  some  countries,  foreign
firms have  a  difficult  time  even learning  about the
contracts  until  after  they  are  awarded.  And  it  is
often  impossible  to  determine  the  amount  of the
winning  bid.  In  other  words,  "buy  national"
programs  work  very successfully  in most nations!
This  is  not  now  a  major  problem  for agriculture,
but  it  can  become  one  as  more  governments
around  the  world become  involved in the purchase
of agricultural  commodities.  (In one  of our major
trading  partners,  for  example,  single  tendering
[i.e.,  negotiating  with  only  one  bidder]  is  per-
mitted  for  procurement  of  any  product  sold  on
a  commodity  exchange.  The  economic  rationale
of that provision is difficult to fathom!)
The  hope  here  is  also  to  negotiate  an interna-
tional  code.  Work  in this area has  been  underway
in  the  Organization  of Economic  Cooperation  &
Development  (the  OECD)  for more than a decade,
so  far  with  limited  success.  But  a  negotiating
group  will  be  formed  in  Geneva  on  the  subject
later  this year,  and  it  will  be able  to build  on  the
OECD  experience.  There  is  a  reasonably  good
chance  that  a  government  procurement  code  can
be completed in  1977.
The  final  defensive  mechanism  worthy  of
mention  is  the  traditional  tariff.  Though  less
restrictive  in an era of floating exchange rates than
has  heretofore  been  the  case,  it  can  still  be  im-
portant  with  certain  products  and  in  certain
countries.  The  U.S.  has  few  tariffs  of  any  con-
sequence  in  the  agricultural  area,  but  other coun-
tries. do.
The  European  Community,  fearful  that  its
valuable  levies  might  be  construed  as  tariffs,  was
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successful  in  limiting  the  tariff  cuts  of  the  Ken-
nedy  Round  in  the  mid-60s  to  industrial  cuts.
They  did  this  by  keeping  agriculture  separated
from  industry  in  the  negotiations,  with  the  U.S.
ultimately discovering that it had little trading  stock
in agriculture. Hence, nothing  much happened.
The  Community  is following precisely  the same
tactics in  the Tokyo Round; early  this month they
placed  their  proposed  tariff  formula  on  the  table
in Geneva,  and it deliberately  excluded  agriculture.
This time, however, U.S. negotiators are determined
that  an  industrial-agricultural  separation  will  not
occur.  In  this they  have  the  strong  backing  of the
entire  U.S.  agricultural  community,  the  Congress,
our  agricultural  advisory  committees,  and  the
Trade  Act  of  1974  itself.  The  agricultural  "give"
in  the  Kennedy  Round  was  primarily  by the U.S.;
we  are  determined  that  this will  not be the case  in
the Tokyo Round!
So  much  for  defensive  actions  which  nations
take  to  protect  their  farmers  from  international
competition.  As  can  readily  be  seen,  there  are  a
host  of  restrictive  devices  in use  for this purpose.
We  can  only hope  that  significant  progress can  be
made  in Geneva  to  reduce  the number and impact
of these  measures.  If this can  be accomplished,  we
will  have  moved  the  world a lot closer to an orien-
tation  of  competitive  agricultural  markets,  with
substantial  comparative advantage characterization.
Trade Measures Taken for Offensive  Purposes
Nations  can  and  do  take  offensive  actions  to
protect  and  benefit  their  farmers  too. The  classic
example  is the export subsidy. In this area, econo-
mists  are  somewhat  ambivalent,  unsure  as  to
whether  such  subsidies  should  be  welcomed,
tolerated,  or  condemned.  Developing  countries,
for  example,  argue  that  export  subsidies  are  es-
sential,  at  least  in  the  short  run,  if they  are  ever
to  become  competitive.  This is the infant industry
principle  or  modifications  thereof.  Economies  of
scale  may  be  necessary  for  a  nation  to  achieve
competitiveness  in  the  exportation  of  a  given
agricultural  product.  This  may,  so  the  argument
goes,  require  both  import  restrictions  and  export
subsidies;  otherwise  the  market  volume necessary
for competitive pricing will  never materialize.
The  developing  countries  have  a  number  of
additional  arguments  in  favor  of their  use  of sub-
sidies-structural  differences,  e.g.,  along  with
terms of trade issues.
Other  nations  argue  that  they  have  a  stronger
social  orientation  than  export  competitors  like
the  United  States.  Exporting  firms  must  pay their
share of the cost of these domestic  social programs.
Therefore,  subsidies are  required  to offset competi-
tive  disadvantage  that  would  otherwise  occur  to
exporters in these socially oriented countries.
I will  not  debate  these  issues  today.  Suffice  it
to  say  that  if  the  above  and  other  arguments
supporting  export  subsidies  have  any  validity  in
economic  theory  at  all,  that validity  is primarily,
if not  entirely,  limited  to  the  developing  nations.
I  am  not  persuaded  that  export  subsidies  can  be
justified  in  the  context  of  international  trade
among the  developed countries. And they certainly
cannot  be  justified  in  predatory  circumstances,
and  where  abuse  of  basic  economic  principles  is
flagrant.
In  the  European  Economic  Community,
export  subsidies  are  the  flip  side  of the  Common
Agricultural  Policy  coin;  variable  levies  being  the
other  side.  With  its  inordinately  high  price  sup-
port  levels,  the  CAP  must  use  variable  levies  to
limit  competition  from  imports.  And it  must  use
export  subsidies  to  rid  itself  of  the  surpluses
that  are  inevitably  generated  when  support  levels
become  inordinately  high.  Without  those  sub-
sidies,  the  Community  would  find  international
price  competition  in  agricultural  products  to  be
very tough indeed.
We  have  used  export  subsidies  of  our  own  in
the  past-and  for  the  same  reason  the Community
uses  them  today!  We  permitted  our support levels
to  get too  high, and we priced  ourselves out of the
world  market.  We  became  residual  suppliers  and,
as  you  will  all  remember,  there  wasn't  much
residual  demand  in  the '60s!
Fortunately,  we  began  in  1965  to  alter  our
farm  policies,  and  we  completed  that  job  in  the
farm  programs  that  were  enacted  by  the  Congress
in  the  early  '70s.  That  series  of legislation  put  us
back  into  the  world  market-where  we  should
have  been  all  the  time, given  the efficiency  of U.S.
producers!  I  hope  we  will  never  again  repeat  the
policy  errors  of  earlier  decades.  Should  we  be
tempted  to  do  so,  we  ought simply  to observe  the
struggles  of western  Europe's  farmers  today.  High
price  supports  are  deluding  them,  just  as  they
deluded  us some years  ago.
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Recently,  for  example,  the  EC  made  a  sale  of
wheat to Brazil,  a traditional  U.S. market. It took a
substantial subsidy for that sale to be made, i.e., for
the EC to be able to undercut U.S. wheat producers!
What  can  one  do  to curb  the  trade  distortions
of  export  subsidies?  First,  with  respect  to  sub-
sidies  designed  to  penetrate  one's own market, the
solution  is relatively  simple. Countervailing  duties
can  be  applied.  We have done  this for both agricul-
tural and non-agricultural  products, to protect U.S.
producers  from  having  their  domestic  market
undercut by subsidized  competition  from abroad.
Under  present  U.S.  law,  "injury"  need not be
proven  in  such  cases.  This  causes  consternation
among  some  of our trading partners.  But one must
ask,  where  in economic  theory  can  a  case  be built
for establishing an injury requirement in such cases,
particularly  when  the  "subsidizer"  is  a  developed
nation!
The  more  difficult  case  is  the  one  involving
"third  country  subsidies,"  e.g.,  the  Brazilian  sale
to  which  I just  alluded. Countervailing  duties  are
of  no  avail  there-unless  the  recipient  country
can  be  persuaded  to  countervail,  which  is  most
unlikely.  The  consumers  of  the  recipient  nation
will  be  delighted  with  the  resource  transfer
represented  in the export subsidy!
To  deal  with  the  third  country  situation,  an
export  subsidy  code undoubtedly  will  be required.
There  are  a good many other trade policy problems
in  the  subsidy-countervailing  duty  area  that  also
merit  international  attention,  i.e.,  inclusion  in  a
code.  For  this  reason,  the  United  States has  sub-
mitted  a  concepts paper on  this subject  in Geneva.
Though  negotiations  in this  area  will be extremely
difficult  and sensitive  (it will probably  be the most
contentious  issue of all in the MTN),  they are criti-
cal  to  the success of the Tokyo  Round. This is one
of the most, if not the most, significant of the non-
tariff  trade  barriers  in use  today.  And it  is poten-
tially  the  most  economically  distortive  of  all.
Therefore,  it  behooves  all  of  us  to  give  subsidy
practices  our  attention,  both  in  an  academic
setting and at the  negotiating table.
A New  Challenge  - Supply  Access
Restrictions  designed  to  protect  and  serve  the
interest  of  domestic  producers  have  for  many
years  been  the  major  challenge  faced  by  trade
negotiators.  As  I have noted, most of these restric-
tions  are  defensive-their  purpose  being  to  keep
competitive  products out.  The exception  is export
subsidies,  which  are  offensive-their  purpose being
to develop  export markets.
A  new  challenge  emerged  in  the  clamor  over
U.S.  grain  sales to the  Soviet  Union, the challenge
of  export  restrictions.  Food  price  increases  in  the
U.S.  during  1973  led  to  strong potitical  pressures
for  export  controls.  The  consumer  movement,
which  had  been  languishing  somewhat  after  its
earlier  successes  on  automobile  safety,  meat  in-
spection,  etc.,  suddenly  found  itself  with  a  new
cause.
Prior  to  1973  food  had  been  a  tremendous
bargain  in  the  U.S.  The  percentage  of income
expended  for food  had dropped  below a  mean  of
16,  for  the  first  time  in history,  and  by  far  the
lowest  in  the  world.  Relative  to  the  consumers
of other  nations,  our  food  is  still  a  bargain,  and
has  been  even  in  the  somewhat  chaotic  days since
those  1972  grain  sales.  Nevertheless,  as  econo-
mists  we  have  learned  that  Americans  are  often
less  concerned  with  absolute  price levels than with
the  rate  of  change  in  those  levels.  (Witness  the
recent  adjustments  to  a  higher  level  of gasoline
prices  and  the  return  to  bigger  cars  vis-a-vis  the
consternation  expressed  when  gasoline  prices
began  their climb.)
Dramatic  incremental adjustments in food costs
during  1973  certainly  caught  the  attention  of
American  housewives.  The  resultant  outcry
(caused  at  least  partially  by  the  economic  distor-
tions  of  a  price-wage  control  program)  ultimately
led  to  the  imposition  of export  controls  on  soy-
beans.  In  retrospect,  this was not one  of the better
public policy  decisions ever made in the U.S.!  From
the  consumer  standpoint,  it  impacted  adversely
on  our  balance  of  trade,  weakened  the  dollar,
and  thereby  made  imports  more  costly.  From
the  producer  standpoint,  it  did  more  damage  to
our  reputation  as  a  dependable  supplier  (i.e.,
exporter)  of  agricultural  products  than  anything
that  has  happened  before  or  since.  In  addition,
it  stimulated  an  enormous  investment  in  alter-
native,  and  ultimately  competitive,  sources  of
supply elsewhere, viz.  Brazil.
We  are  not  alone  in  applying  export  restric-
tions. Other nations have done so too, for a variety
of  reasons-economic,  foreign  policy,  national
security,  or  combinations  thereof.  In  ferrous
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scrap,  for  example,  essentially  everyone  but  the
U.S. applies export controls.
This  issue  has  stimulated  a  great  deal  of  dis-
cussion in international  fora. It has become  known
as the "supply  access"  question.  GATT rounds  of
trade  negotiations  have  to  date  been  devoted
almost  exclusively  to  "market  access."  Supply
access  has  had  little  attention,  but  tensions  have
been  building  and  many  believe  that  a  compre-
hensive  code  of  conduct  is  needed.  The  major
stimulus  for  this  concern  has,  of course,  come
from  the  OPEC  oil  cartel.  But  there  is  also  con-
cern  about  access  to  food  supplies,  enhanced  by
the  trend  toward  long  term  contracting  among
food  exporters  and  importers  and  the  resultant
thinning of the world market.
At  the  moment  no  action  is  underway  in
Geneva in this area.
Summary
In  summary,  agricultural  trade  barriers  are
on  the  front  burner  of  the  MTN  in  Geneva.  So
long  as  they  are  negotiated  with  barriers  to non-
agricultural  products,  considerable  movement
toward  a  "comparative  advantage  world"  is
possible.  As  a  major  actual  and  potential  ex-
porter  of  farm  products,  the  U.S.  should  gain
from  a  significant  reduction  and/or  elimination of
agricultural  trade  barriers.  Our  producers  will
benefit directly, our consumers indirectly.
In  specific  areas  of  the  negotiations,  we  are
hopeful  that  tariff  levels  will  be  reduced  more
than  in  the  Kennedy  Round.  Our  own tariff pro-
posal  meets  that  objective.  An  export  subsidy-
countervailing  duty code should emerge  at the end
of  a  hard  fought  negotiation.  If  this  does  not
occur,  the United  States will  protect  itself domes-
tically  through  its  countervailing  duty  authority,
internationally  in  third  country  subsidy  cases
through use of the retaliatory provisions of Section
301  of the  Trade  Act of 1974.  A  standards  code,
which  could  prove  to  be  extremely  important  to
agriculture,  is  likely,  as  is  significant  progress  on
quantitative  restrictions.  The  probability  of agree-
ment  on  additional  codes-government  procure-
ment,  safeguards,  and  supply access-is difficult  to
determine  at this stage  of the negotiating process.
Our  goal  is  to wind  up  the  Tokyo  Round  by
the  end  of  1977,  meaning  that  the  economic
benefits  of  more  liberal  trade  should  begin  to
flow soon thereafter.
Potential Contributions by the Agricultural
Economist
I would like now to turn briefly to the  role that
my  profession  might  play  in  international  trade
policy.  Some  of my  comments  will  be  short  run
in  nature,  i.e.,  related  to  the  MTN;  others  will
have a longer time spectrum.
First, it is important that we in the U.S. develop
more  trade  policy  expertise  than  we  have  today.
We  are  much too thin-in  government, in  the  aca-
demic  community,  and  in  the  private  sector-in
people  who  truly  understand  international  trade,
and trade  policy  issues. One of the reasons for this
is  that  international  trade  traditionally  has  not
been  all  that significant to the U.S. economy. Until
recently  it  has  composed  only  4  or  5 percent of
Gross  National  Product.  But that  figure  has  since
doubled,  and  is likely  to  move  higher in  the  com-
ing  years.  Export  trade  is,  of course,  much  more
significant than that in the agricultural  sector.
Another  reason  for our paucity of international
trade  talent  is  that  GATT negotiations  have been
conducted  on a stop and go, round-by-round  basis.
We've  trained  people  for  each  of  the  rounds,
particularly  in  Federal  agencies.  But  then  we've
reduced  staffing  between  rounds,  and  have  lost
the  benefit  of that  training  and  experience.  My
hope  is  that  we'll  quit  having  rounds  of negotia-
tions, and  will  develop  a  permanent  group  of well
trained  professionals  to  serve  the  needs  of U.S.
trade  policy  as we consult  and  negotiate  with  our
trading partners on a more or less continuous basis.
Not only are we shorthanded in the professional
area,  but  we  are also  plagued  by a  level of public
knowledge  of international  trade  that leaves much
to be  desired. How many of our citizens understand
the  term  "balance  of  trade?"  How  many  can
define  "countervailing  duties?"  How  many  have
even heard  of a "variable  levy?"  As we expand U.S.
involvement  in  international  trade,  we  have  a  big
educational  effort  ahead  if we  are to make  sound
public  policy  decisions.  In  the  agricultural  sector,
it is  you who must inevitably carry a large share of
that load.
But let us concentrate  now  on some  of our im-
mediate needs.
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First, in the entire area of developed-developing
country  relationships  we  need  help.  Admittedly,
political  considerations  will  play  a  major  role  in
the evolution  of these relationships; witness recent
meetings  of  the  United  Nations  and  its  agencies.
Nevertheless,  we  should  operate  from  the  best
possible  base  of  economic  theory  that  we  can
develop.
Many  volumes have already  been written on the
development  process.  But  the  orientation  is  not
very  useful  in  a  negotiating  setting.  In  Geneva,
long term ivory tower solutions are of no practical
consequence.  We  need  to know  how  we  can build
"special and  differential  treatment"  for LDCs into
the  drafting  of a subsidy code,  the implementation
of a  tariff formula,  the concept  of safeguarding  a
nation's  balance  of payments.  The  protection  of
the  interests  of  the  U.S.  and  other  developed
countries  is  only  one  element  of  this  need;  we
must  also  make  sure  that  what  is  done  for  the
developing  countries  is  not beneficial  in the  short
run, detrimental  in the long run.
Among  the  relevant  questions  of the  day  are:
"When, if ever,  should either developed  or develop-
ing  countries  be  permitted  under  international
rules to use export  subsidies?"  "Is maintenance  of
export  earnings,  as  illustrated,  e.g.,  by  the Rome
Convention,  a  defensible  economic  concept?"
"And  what  of  the  desire  by developing  countries
for  indexation  of  their  exports  vis-a-vis  imports
from  the  developed  world?"  "How  should  inter-
national  trading  rules  and  dispute  settlement
provisions  respond  to developing country  cartels?"
"How  does  one  define  a  developing  country?
Should  there  be  two  or  more  categories  of  such
countries?  If so,  where  should  the  line  be  drawn?
What are the criteria? When does a nation 'graduate'
from  one  development  stage  to  the  next,  and
ultimately  to  developed  status?"  "Are  there  eco-
nomic  tradeoffs  between  price  stability  and  the
incentive  to produce,  i.e.,  are  private sector incen-
tives  reduced  when  governments  implement
'stability'  programs?  It is possible  to devise  stabil-
ity mechanisms  which  are  not  price depressing?"
"Is  it  economically  feasible  for  developing  coun-
tries  to  apply  import  restrictions  to protect  their
domestic  industries?  If so,  when?  Or  should  their
emphasis be on reducing trade barriers in developed
countries,  rather  than  creating  barriers  of  their
own?"  "How  does  one  determine  the  probable
international  competitiveness  of  a  developing-
country  industry?  That  is,  how  does  one  decide
that  the infant industry  argument  applies?"  "And
on  what basis  should  a  developed  country  (or  the
developing  country,  for  that matter)  decide,  at a
later  date,  that  the  infant  industry  decision  was
wrong,  and  that  the  industry  should  no  longer
receive  special benefits under international rules?"
These  are  just  a  few  of  a  multitude  of  issues
which exist today in the trade context of DC-LDC
relationships. Many more will emerge in the coming
years.  The  trend  is  clearly  toward  "more  trade,
less  aid,"  for LDCs.  That being  the case,  we need
to  learn  how  that  trade  can  best  be  conducted.
If  there  are  to  be  special  rules  to  benefit  the
developing  countries-and  this  is  a  foregone  con-
clusion-then  we  need  to have  some  imagination
in  devising  those  rules  so  that  all  the  world  will
benefit.  Whatever  be  the  rules,  we need  to know
their  probable  economic  impact.  Today  this is  a
fertile  area  of interest,  but  not  a  terribly  fertile
area of knowledge.
Second,  we  need  help  in  defining  "injury"
in  a  trade  policy  context  and  in dealing with  the
concept  of  injury  in  trade  disputes.  One  can
readily  devise  dozens  of  definitions  for  injury,
depending  on the  adjective that is used.  One might
have  "material  injury,"  "substantial  injury,"
"significant  injury,"  or any  one  of a host of other
alternatives.  Each of these  terms  can, if one is not
careful, be interpreted in many  different ways.
Injury  ought  to  be  an  economic  concept,  not
a political  one.  We  ought  first to determine where
in  the  GATT  rules  and  codes  proof of injury  is
even  appropriate.  The  U.S.  does  not  now  apply
an  injury  test  in  the  application  of its  counter-
vailing  duty  law,  and  we are  not at all  persuaded
that  our  law  should  be  changed.  If,  however,
injury  might  appropriately  be  insisted  upon  as  a
prerequisite  to  certain  actions  taken  under  the
GATT,  the  definition  and  interpretation  of  the
concept  becomes  of  critical  importance.  Can
one  adjective  serve  the  needs  of  all  rules  and
all  codes?  If  not,  how  does  one  avoid  confusion
between  an  injury  provision  in  a  subsidy  code
which  uses  one  adjective,  and  a  similar  provision
in  a  safeguards  code  with  a  different  adjective.
Add  to  this  the  possibility  of still another  defini-
tion  for  developing  countries  and it is no wonder
that  one  of  the  needs  in  the  GATT  is  for  an
improved  dispute  settlement  procedure!  If econo-
104
June 1977Liberalized Agricultural  Trade
mists  can  help  us  to  make  sense  of the  injury
question, we will be eternally grateful.
Third,  we  need  to  learn  a lot  more  about  the
implications  of  floating  exchange  rates  to  trade
policy.  For  example,  should  nations  now  be  pre-
cluded  from  using  trade  measures  to  rectify  bal-
ance  of  payments  deficits?  Will  not  floating
exchange  rates  do  the job,  thereby  avoiding  the
use of trade restrictions which distort international
economic  relationships?  Or  is there  likely to be  a
lag involved with floating, such that trade measures
will still be needed? Should trade measures  then be
more  carefully  circumscribed  in  their time  frame,
so  that  floating  rates  will  take over  the  balancing
job  as  quickly  as  possible?  And  what  of "dirty
float?"  Though this may lead to increased stability
in exchange  rates, will it not also  prevent some of
the  benefits  of clean floating from being fully  real-
ized?  And  what  of nations which maintain a fixed
exchange  rate  relationship  with  some  countries,
but  float  vis-a-vis  others?  How  can  their situation
be  meshed into the  GATT rules of the future?  Fin-
ally,  how  can  we  do  a  better job of coordinating
monetary and trade policy internationally?
The  era of floating  exchange  rates is just begin-
ning to unfold. It is imperative  that we quickly and
comprehensively  study  and  evaluate  the economic
impact  of floating,  and  apply what we learn in the
development  of U.S.  and international trade policy.
This  is  an  area  in  which  sophisticated  economic
analysis can have  a very great payoff.
Fourth, we  badly  need  updated  estimates  of
price  and  income  elasticities  for  all  significant
U.S.  exports  and  imports.  Present  data  is  simply
inadequate.  It  is unfortunate  that we must go into
a  negotiation  as  important  as  the  Tokyo  Round,
with  billions  of  dollars  of international  trade  at
stake,  and  be  dependent  upon  elasticity  estimates
that  are  obsolete  and  of dubious  accuracy.  Elas-
ticity  estimates  are  relevant  to  every  phase  of the
negotiations-to  determine  the  probable  impact
of a given  tariff formula,  to  evaluate  the  effect of
excepting  a particular  product from the application
of  that  formula,  to appraise  probable  trade  flows
that will  emerge  from  granting  LDCs  a  given  type
of  special  and  differential  treatment,  etc.  If U.S.
agricultural  economists  can  provide  our  negotia-
tors  with  improved  elasticity  estimates  in  the
future,  it will be of very great benefit to all.
Fifth, we  live  in  a  country  in  which  private
enterprise  has  been  the  bulwark  of our economic
development.  This is especially  true in agriculture,
where  we  have long  been at the  head  of the  class
in  both  production  practices  and  marketing
techniques.
Our market  oriented system  has  served us well.
Yet  the trend  elsewhere  in the world  seems  often
to  be  in the other direction. Government  planners
typically  want  to manage  the economy.  One  con-
stantly  hears  the  refrain,  "The  market  system
just won't work for  us."  Or, "The free market is a
thing of the  past."  But must it  be!  Cannot  we,  as
U.S.  agricultural  economists,  provide  a  private
sector  alternative  that  will  serve  the  agricultural
needs  of other nations? Can we not show them the
benefits  of private  incentives,  as reflected  by  the
performance  of U.S.  farmers? For example,  would
it not be  beneficial  to point  out the dramatic way
in  which  American  farmers  shift  their  cropping
practices  in  response  to  price  signals,  and  alter
their  livestock  operations  for  the  same  reason?
Could we  not,  for example,  describe  the  workings
of  U.S.  futures  markets  and  the  potential  they
have  for  stabilizing  prices of given  commodities-
in the  aggregate  and  for an individual  producer or
processor?  Might  this  not  be  a  viable  alternative,
for  a  good  many  commodities  at least,  to  much
more costly buffer stock schemes?
Technical  assistance  is,  of course,  an important
aspect  of all of this. If U.S.  agricultural economists
have  something  worthwhile  to  say  to  the  rest  of
the  world,  and  particularly  to  the  developing
countries  which  are  so  much  in need,  it will  have
to  be  said  primarily  through  technical  assistance
programs.  We've  done  a  lot  in  this  area,  perhaps
more  than  any  other  developed  country  in  the
world.  But  we  have  only  scratched  the  surface.
Though  we  have  generally  embarked  upon  tech-
nical assistance efforts out of humanitarian motives,
those efforts  have  usually  turned  out to  be in our
self interest.  As  we  have  taught  farmers  in other
countries  to produce  more,  the  total development
process  of those  countries  has  accelerated.  This
has made  them better  customers for our industrial
goods,  and  likewise  better  customers  for  U.S.
agricultural  exports  as  they  upgrade  their  diets
by  expanding  livestock  and  poultry  production.
Hence,  with  an  effective  technical  assistance
program,  the  recipient country  gains, and we gain.
Should  we not then have  a much stronger commit-
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ment  to  such  endeavors,  both  in  our nation  as  a
whole, and among our academic institutions?
Conclusion
One  could  go  on with  many  other examples  of
economic  work  for  which  there  is  a  dire need  in
the  trade  policy  arena.  I have  cited  only  a  few  in
which present  deficiencies  are  particularly  glaring.
There  is  much  to  do  if  we  are  to  make  sound
public  policy  decisions  in this area,  decisions  that
will  advance  the  cause  of American  agriculture.
I  know  that  you  have  both  the  talent  and  the
enthusiasm  to undertake  this most important task.
Thank you.
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